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In quantum game theory, one of the most intriguing and important questions is, “Is it possible
to get quantum advantages without any modification of the classical game?” The answer to this
question so far has largely been negative. So far, it has usually been thought that a change of the
classical game setting appears to be unavoidable for getting the quantum advantages. However, we
give an affirmative answer here, focusing on the decision-making process (we call ‘reasoning’) to
generate the best strategy, which may occur internally, e.g., in the player’s brain. To show this, we
consider a classical guessing game. We then define a one-player reasoning problem in the context
of the decision-making theory, where the machinery processes are designed to simulate classical and
quantum reasoning. In such settings, we present a scenario where a rational player is able to make
better use of his/her weak preferences due to quantum reasoning, without any altering or resetting
of the classically defined game. We also argue in further analysis that the quantum reasoning may
make the player fail, and even make the situation worse, due to any inappropriate preferences.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory, which is a very well established disci-
pline in mathematics [1], has successfully been applied
to various fields, such as social science [2, 3], evolutions
in biology [4], and economics [5]. At the abstract level,
game theory mainly deals with legitimate strategies and
scores of the players. Thus, a game is defined by the
strategies on one hand, and by a specification of how
to evaluate the players’ game scores on the other hand.
Recently, physicists have been attempting to generalize
the game into a new scenario finding common theoret-
ical properties between the game and quantum theory
[6–10]. Of particular interest to this generalization is to
study whether it is possible to replace the classical strat-
egy with a quantum strategy for getting quantum advan-
tages, if any [11]. The quantum advantages from such a
generalization have been found to be relevant to these
games. For example, consider the “penny-flip game” [6],
where two players take turns choosing whether or not to
flip a penny inside a box, and the starting player opens
the box to identify if the penny is flipped from its start-
ing position or not. Here, if one player can adopt a quan-
tum penny, then he/she has a better chance of winning
assisted by quantum superposition. Another celebrated
example is the “Prisoner’s game” [7, 8], where two players
face a dilemma, since acting rationally for their own in-
terests would result in a collectively worse outcome. But
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this dilemma can also be solved by adopting quantum
strategies that the players can realize. Most recently,
some new game scenarios have been conceived, that es-
tablish a strong link to communication complexity [12]
and Bell-inequality engaging the nonlocality [13, 14].
Following up on the successes of the previous studies
of the quantum game, we also plan to explore a posi-
tive role of the ‘quantum’ in a classically designed game.
In particular, we consider the following question, “Is it
possible to get quantum advantages without any quan-
tum modification?” This question is important because
nearly all games are allowed to have the advantages due
to “quantum strategies”, but it has usually been thought
that one inevitably needs to change the original form
of the classical game to enjoy the quantum advantages
[15, 16]. Therefore, the answer to the aforementioned
question has been negative. However, here we find an
affirmative answer, focusing on — substantially differ-
ent from the earlier approaches — the decision-making
(we call “reasoning” hereafter) of the rational player. To
show this, we design a classical two-player game, called
the Secret-Bit Guessing Game, where one player named
Bob attempts to guess the secret bits of the other player,
Alice. For this game, we map out two parallel ways of
Bob’s reasoning to choose his best answering strategies:
one is classical probabilistic, and the other is quantum.
Each reasoning that is drawn in Bob’s brain is modeled
as a machinery process for systematic analysis and fair
comparison. On the basis of the payoff-function analy-
sis, we explicitly show that the quantum reasoning can be
more advantageous without changing the classical setting
of the game. This is because the rational player, Bob, can
make better use of his weak preferences, faithfully deal-
ing with quantum superposition. However, we also ar-
2gue in further analysis that the quantum reasoning may
frustrate Bob, and even make the situation worse due
to malicious hints that can lead Bob to have the wrong
preferences.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. A secert-bit guessing game
Firstly, we consider a secret-bit guessing game [17, 18].
In the game, Alice generates two bits and keeps them
on her memory Mx (x = 0, 1). Here we note that the
identity of the bits are in Mx, regardless of whether any-
one can access it or not (i.e., the secret bits are classi-
cal). Then, the other player Bob chooses his answering
strategies uBob ∈ {0, 1} to guess the secret bits enveloped
by Alice, considering four possible strategies uAlice(x)
(x = 0, 1) that Alice may have. Specifically,
Mx ←


[τ .1] uAlice(x) = 0,
[τ .2] uAlice(x) = x,
[τ .3] uAlice(x) = 1⊕ x,
[τ .4] uAlice(x) = 1,
(1)
where ‘⊕’ denotes modulo-2 addition. Here, if Bob’s an-
swer is correct (i.e., uBob = uAlice) for a given x, Bob
wins a single-point 12 and Alice loses the same single-
point. Otherwise, in case Bob gives wrong answer (i.e.,
uBob 6= uAlice), Alice and Bob get the single-points
1
2
and − 12 , respectively. This game is thus defined as
G = G(S, P ), where S and P denote the (non-empty)
sets of the players’ strategies (uAlice, uBob) and game
scores (ξAlice, ξBob), respectively. Noting that Bob makes
two answers for Mx (x = 0, 1), the possible game scores
for Alice and Bob after one game are made by adding
the two single-points, and thus ξAlice, ξBob ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
Note further that ξAlice is equal to −ξBob, or equivalently,
ξAlice + ξBob = 0; i.e., our game is zero-sum [1].
B. One-player reasoning problem
Whereas in previous studies the strategies have usu-
ally been generalized in a quantum regime, our primary
concern here is with the reasoning process. In particular,
we would like to investigate if a quantum reasoning can
yield a higher winning average compared to the classical
ones even in a fully classical game. We now turn our
attention to Bob’s reasoning to make his valid answering
strategies uBob for x = 0, 1. We define this a “One-Player
Reasoning Problem.”
To deal with this problem, we design a process of Bob’s
reasoning by introducing a one-bit Boolean function,
uBob(x) = r0 ⊕ r1x, (2)
where r0, r1 ∈ {0, 1}. Then, Bob’s reasoning is nothing
but the process of making the output uBob(x) for a given
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FIG. 1: (Color online) For each set of Alice’s strategies
uAlice(x) (x = 0, 1), we specify the regions of well-quantified
probabilities of Bob’s preferences in the space of (α0, α1).
x ∈ {0, 1}, depending on the coefficients (r0, r1) ∈ R.
Note that the function in Eq. (2) can generate all possi-
ble sets [τ .1]-[τ .4] of uAlice(x) in Eq. (1). Here we con-
sider the concept of a hint given from, e.g., a helper [40],
which allows Bob to have (‘weak’ or possibly ‘strong’)
preferences over R. Thus, we can formulate our prob-
lem (R, %) with Bob’s preferences and alternatives R
in the context of the theory of decision-making [1]. We
note that the hints are presented in abstract form. We
assume an “interpretation function” that quantifies his
own preferences, such that [41]
{Pr(r0 → k),Pr(r1 → k
′)} ∈ H (k, k′ = 0, 1), (3)
where Pr(rj → k) denotes the probability of choosing
“rj → k” (j, k = 0, 1), and H denotes the possible set of
those probabilities. Here, Pr(rj → k ⊕ 1) = 1− Pr(rj →
k). Thus if Pr(rj → k) ≥
1
2 , Bob wants to choose “rj →
k”, at least as much as “rj → k ⊕ 1” (i.e., “rj → k” %
“rj → k⊕1”), and vice versa. More specifically, we write
Pr(rj → k) as
Pr(rj → k) =
1
2
+ (−1)kαj , (4)
where αj ∈ [−
1
2 ,
1
2 ] is defined as a factor to represent the
bias of Bob’s preferences.
Here, if the direction of α = (α0, α1)
T is appropri-
ately assigned, we say that the probabilities in Eq. (3)
are well-quantified, where α was defined as a vector on
the two-dimensional space of (α1, α2). For example, if
Alice’s strategies uAlice(x) are [τ .1], the well-quantified
probabilities are characterized with the directional con-
dition (α1 > 0 and α2 > 0) (see Fig. 1 for all the cases).
Bob is supposed to perform his reasoning, believing his
ability to interpret the given hints. A schematic picture
of our game is presented in Fig. 2.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Schematic picture of our game setting.
Alice sets the two secret bits into her memory Mx (x = 0, 1)
and Bob attempts to guess them. In this game, we define
one-player (Bob’s) reasoning problem with a certain set of
probabilities of the player’s own preferences, as in Eq. (3).
Here, we replace the reasoning to the process of a machinery
that consists of the corresponding internal devices involved
(e.g., one inside the player’s brain). See main text in Sec. III.
III. TWO PARALLEL REASONING
PROCESSES: CLASSICAL PROBABILISTIC,
AND QUANTUM
In order to perform a more systematic analysis, we re-
place the reasoning to a machinery process, which may
occur, e.g., in Bob’s brain. To this end, we consider a
fledged computing module, as depicted in Fig. 2, to sim-
ulate the reasoning process of Eq. (2) [19]. This comput-
ing module consists of two one-way channels Cx and Cy,
where Cx transmits the classical signals of the memory
number x, and Cy deals with the signals of Bob’s strate-
gies uBob(x) (x = 0, 1). Two probabilistic logic gates R0
and R1 are also placed in Cy, but note that R1 acts con-
ditioned on the input x in Cx being 1. Bob’s strategies
uBob(x) are identified by the measurement at the end of
Cy. We here introduce another internal machine, to be
called an interpretation machine, to generate the proba-
bilities Pr(rj → k) (j, k = 0, 1) of Bob’s preferences.
With this general model of reasoning machinery, we as-
sume that Bob can make two different types of reasoning:
Classical probabilistic and quantum. Here, we note that
the signals x in Cx should be classical even in the case of
quantum reasoning, as it is regarded as an element of the
game. Thus, we do not need to consider any additional
internal process to convert the classical information to
the quantum information in the reasoning, or vice versa
[16]. This assumption is not trivial, as we have to make
a fair comparison of the two reasonings, independently
from the classically designed game [42].
1) Classical probabilistic reasoning. – Firstly, let us
assume that the signals of Cy are classical and the logic
gates Rj (j = 0, 1) act according to the probabilistic
rule, to be either “1 ” with the probability Pr(rj → 0) or
“NOT” with the probability Pr(rj → 1). In this case, R0
and R1 are classical probabilistic gates. Such a probabilis-
tic instruction results in better computational outputs in
a heuristic manner [20], and could allow a reasonable
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FIG. 3: (Color online) A realizable and concrete setting of
Bob’s classical probabilistic reasoning. In such a setting,
the analyzer (or the controller) receives the quantified prob-
abilities from the interpretation machine, and performs the
Monte-Carlo method by generating a (classical) random num-
ber r ∈ [0, 1). Here, if the randomly generated r is smaller (or
larger) than Pr(rj → 0), the switching device of Rj connects
the incoming signal to ‘Identity’ (or ‘NOT’). Bob identifies a
value of uBob(x) for given x in the classical measurement.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) A setting of Bob’s quantum reasoning.
Here we consider a linear optical implementation, where the
signals of Cy are encoded as polarized single-photon states |H〉
and |V 〉 (H = 0 and V = 1). The unitary gates Rˆj (j = 0, 1)
are realized by a set of wave plates (QWP-HWP-QWP) for
the polarized photon [21]. The analyzer maps the quantified
probabilities in Eq. (3) to the control parameters of the wave-
plates, using Eq. (5) and Eq. (6). Then, Bob’s brain performs
the quantum measurement on the final output photon.
comparison with the unitary gates adopted in the quan-
tum reasoning (as described later). To make the strategy
of the answer uBob(x) for a given x, the final value 0 or
1 passing through the gates Rj (j = 0, 1) is identified by
the classical measurement. In Fig. 3, we sketch a real-
izable and concrete implementation of such a machinery
process for the classical probabilistic reasoning.
2) Quantum reasoning. – On the other hand, Bob can
also follow the quantum reasoning, where the crucial part
of the computing module, including the channel Cy, logic
gates Rj (j = 0, 1), and measurement device, are quan-
tum. In such a case, each of the gates Rj (j = 0, 1) is to
4be a unitary transformation, defined as
Rˆj =
( √
Pr(rj → 0) e
iφj
√
Pr(rj → 1)
e−iφj
√
Pr(rj → 1) −
√
Pr(rj → 0)
)
, (5)
which also leaves and flips the states |0〉 and |1〉 with
the probability Pr(rj → 0) and Pr(rj → 1), respectively.
However, it should be noted that the unitary gate Rˆj has
an additional degree of freedom, i.e., quantum phase φj ,
to exhibit the genuine property of the quantum superpo-
sition [43]. It allows the rational player, Bob, to explore
an additional rule for setting the phases φj (j = 0, 1)
to maximize his winning averages. In our game, Bob
additionally uses the directional condition of α, which
could not considered in the classical probabilistic reason-
ing. More specifically, Bob’s brain sets the phases φj
(j = 0, 1), according to

(i) ∆ = 0 if α0α1 > 0,
(ii) ∆ = 12 if α0α1 = 0,
(iii) ∆ = 1 if α0α1 < 0,
(6)
where ∆ = φ1 − φ0. These rules were made to maximize
Bob’s winning averages. Here, the case (i) describes the
situation that Bob’s brain, internally, chooses ∆ = 0
when α contains the directional conditions (α0 > 0,
α1 > 0) or (α0 < 0, α1 < 0), which are toward [τ .1]
and [τ .3], respectively. In the case of (iii), ∆ is set to
be 1 with (α0 > 0, α1 < 0) or (α0 < 0, α1 > 0) whose
directions are toward [τ .2] and [τ .4], respectively. How-
ever, in the case of (ii), i.e., when α0 = 0 or α1 = 0,
it is not possible to find any useful setting, as a feasible
direction of α cannot be sured. At the final step, Bob’s
brain performs the quantum measurement on the final
state to get uBob(x). Note that, in the view of the intrin-
sic probabilistic nature of the quantum system, the final
state does not result in a definite or predictable outcome
value. In Fig. 4, a schematic example of such a quan-
tum reasoning procedure is sketched in the linear-optical
regime.
Here, we briefly comment that the two settings de-
scribed above are parallel in the sense that the opera-
tion of the logic gates are comparable in each reasoning.
Note that, for the number of games, the operations of
the classical probabilistic gates Rj (j = 0, 1) can also be
represented by a stochastic evolution matrix as
Rj =
(
Pr(rj → 0) Pr(rj → 1)
Pr(rj → 1) Pr(rj → 0)
)
, (7)
where the matrix elements may provide the candidate
transition probabilities which describe the dynamics of
unitary transformation of Eq. (5) [44].
IV. ANALYSIS OF BOB’S AVERAGE SCORES
ACHIEVABLE FROM THE TWO REASONINGS
A crucial task in game theory is to investigate a func-
tion f$, which determines the average scores of the play-
ers over the number of games. In our game, such a func-
tion f$, named the payoff function, can be defined by
f$ : S ×H ×A→ (ΞAlice ∈ R,ΞBob ∈ R) , (8)
where ΞAlice and ΞBob denote the total average scores
of Alice and Bob, respectively, and A denotes the set of
possible reasonings. As mentioned before, our game is a
two-player zero-sum game, so it is sufficient to analyze
the score of one of the players. We thus focus on the
average score ΞBob of Bob throughout the work.
More specifically, the total average score ΞBob can be
evaluated as
ΞBob =
1
4
4∑
τ=1
ξBob,τ , (9)
where it is assumed that Alice chooses her bits at random.
Here, ξBob,τ (τ = 1, 2, 3, 4) is also defined as the score
averaged for a specific set of uAlice(x) (j = 0, 1),
ξBob,τ =
∑
x=0,1
(
1
2
Pr (uBob(x) = uAlice(x)) −
1
2
Pr (uBob(x) 6= uAlice(x))
)
, (10)
where Pr(uBob(x) = uAlice(x)) and Pr(uBob(x) 6= uAlice(x)) are the probabilities that Bob’s answer is correct and
incorrect for a given x, respectively, and τ denotes the index of the possible sets [τ .1]-[τ .4] of Alice’s strategies
uAlice(x). For our later analysis, we here rewrite ξBob,τ , for each τ , as
ξBob,1 =
1
2
(Pr(uBob = 0|x = 0) + Pr(uBob = 0|x = 1)− Pr(uBob = 1|x = 0)− Pr(uBob = 1|x = 1)) ,
ξBob,2 =
1
2
(Pr(uBob = 0|x = 0) + Pr(uBob = 1|x = 1)− Pr(uBob = 1|x = 0)− Pr(uBob = 0|x = 1)) ,
ξBob,3 =
1
2
(Pr(uBob = 1|x = 0) + Pr(uBob = 0|x = 1)− Pr(uBob = 0|x = 0)− Pr(uBob = 1|x = 1)) ,
ξBob,4 =
1
2
(Pr(uBob = 1|x = 0) + Pr(uBob = 1|x = 1)− Pr(uBob = 0|x = 0)− Pr(uBob = 0|x = 1)) , (11)
5FIG. 5: (Color online) Bob’s average score Ξ
(C)
Bob (density-plot
on the left, and 3D-plot on the right) with respect to |α0| and
|α1|. Here we assume that Bob’s brain performs the reasoning
with the well-quantified probabilities of his preferences.
where Pr(uBob|x) (x = 0, 1) is the probability that Bob
identifies uBob(x), given the memory number x. In the
following, we shall analyze the total average score ΞBob
achievable from each of the two reasonings.
1) Average score achievable from the classical proba-
bilistic reasoning. – First, we write out explicitly the con-
ditional probabilities Pr(uBob|x) (x = 0, 1) in Eq. (11):
Pr(uBob = 0|x = 0) =
1
2
+ α0,
Pr(uBob = 1|x = 0) =
1
2
− α0,
Pr(uBob = 0|x = 1) =
1
2
+ α0α1,
Pr(uBob = 1|x = 1) =
1
2
− α0α1. (12)
Here, from Eqs. (9)-(11), we can derive that, if there is
no biased value of the factor α (i.e., α0 = α1 = 0), and
hence Bob’s preferences, then Bob’s total average score
ΞBob will be 0. In such a case, Bob would become in-
different (i.e., ‘∼’) to the choice of his strategies. How-
ever, if Bob can have a finite non-zero value of α for the
given hints, the winning average can be improved. For
example, when Alice’s strategies uAlice(x) are [τ .1] and
the probabilities of Bob’s preferences are well-quantified
with the directional condition (α0 > 0, α1 > 0) (as de-
picted in Fig. 1), Bob’s average score can be increased
up to α0 + 2α0α1 > 0. By generalizing this advantage
for other cases, it is found that Bob can have
Ξ
(C)
Bob = |α0|+ 2 |α0| |α1| > 0, (13)
where the superscript ‘(C)’ means that the score is
achievable from the classical probabilistic reasoning. In
Fig. 5, the graphs of Ξ
(C)
Bob are given with respect to
|α0| and |α1|, assuming that the probabilities of Bob’s
preferences are well-quantified for the given hints. How-
ever, if Bob uses ill-quantified probabilities, Bob could
have Ξ
(C)
Bob < 0, decreasing his winning average (see ap-
pendix A for details about this). This situation may arise
when the hints are made with any malicious intention.
FIG. 6: (Color online) Bob’s average score Ξ
(Q)
Bob (density-plot
on the left, and 3D-plot on the right). The probabilities as in
Eq. (3) are also assumed to be well-quantified, and Bob can
chose appropriate phase factors φj (j = 0, 1) following the
rules in Eq. (6).
2) Average scores achievable from the quantum reason-
ing. – To analyze Bob’s score achievable from the quan-
tum reasoning, we also evaluate the conditional proba-
bilities Pr(uBob|x) (x = 0, 1) as
Pr(uBob = 0|x = 0) =
1
2
+ α0,
Pr(uBob = 1|x = 0) =
1
2
− α0,
Pr(uBob = 0|x = 1) =
1
2
+ α0α1 + Γcos(pi∆),
Pr(uBob = 1|x = 1) =
1
2
− α0α1 − Γ cos(pi∆), (14)
where Γ is defined as
Γ = 2
√(
1
4
− |α0|
2
)(
1
4
− |α1|
2
)
. (15)
Here we readily see that the additional term “Γ cos(pi∆)”
appears in the case of x = 1. We note, again, that the
factor ∆ comes from the quantum phases φj (j = 0, 1)
involved in the unitary gates Rˆj (j = 0, 1). Thus, by
applying the rules of Eq. (6), Bob can get (as long as
α0 6= 0 and α1 6= 0)
Ξ
(Q)
Bob = Ξ
(C)
Bob + Γ, (16)
where the superscript ‘(Q)’ denotes the score obtained
by quantum reasoning. Here, by observing Eq. (16), we
can directly see that Ξ
(Q)
Bob is always larger than or equal
to Ξ
(C)
Bob, which means that Bob can increase his winning
average more than in the classical probabilistic reason-
ing, notably even in the case where the elements of the
game are all classical. The equality is satisfied when the
given hints are perfect; namely, when |α0| = |α1| =
1
2 .
This is quite natural, because if the given hints contain
whole information of uAlice(x), then Bob can have strong
preferences (i.e., ‘≻’) toward his 100% winning [45]. In
Fig. 6, we give the graphs of Ξ
(Q)
Bob for the well-quantified
probabilities. However, we should point out that Bob’s
6FIG. 7: (Color online) The simulation data of Ξ
(C)
Bob (blue
circle) and Ξ
(Q)
Bob (red circle) are plotted for the two reasonings:
(left) Classical probabilistic, and (right) quantum. The solid
lines are the theoretical values drawn by Eq. (13) and Eq. (16).
The data are very well matched to the theoretical lines.
winning average can also be decreased due to any mali-
cious hinting. In particular, Ξ
(Q)
Bob could be much smaller
than Ξ
(C)
Bob in the worst case (see appendix A).
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We now demonstrate the results of our theoretical
analysis through numerical simulations that are designed
based on Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Firstly, we assume that
Bob enjoys a finite number of games N following each
of the two reasoning processes. Here, Alice chooses her
secret-bits randomly in each game and Bob’s brain al-
ways uses well-quantified probabilities (i.e., the certain
values of |α0| and |α1| with appropriately assigned direc-
tional conditions). In Fig. 7, we plot the data of Ξ
(C)
Bob
and Ξ
(Q)
Bob obtained from (left) classical probabilistic and
(right) quantum reasoning. The data are plotted in the
space of |α0| and |α1| (from 0.05 up to 0.45 at 0.05 in-
tervals). Each point is made by averaging the scores
over N = 104 games. Note that the graphs are dupli-
cating Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. Actually, the data are very well
matched to the theoretical values (the solid lines) drawn
by Eq. (13) and (16).
We then plot the data of Ξ
(C)
Bob (blue square) and Ξ
(Q)
Bob
(red circle) with respect to |α| in Fig. 8. Here, we let
|α| = |α0| = |α1|. Each data point is also averaged
over N = 104 games, and the quantified probabilities
in Eq. (3) are assumed to be good. The dashed (blue
and red) lines denote the theoretical values, drawn by
Eq. (13) and Eq. (16). In this case, it is directly seen that
the increments of Bob’s average scores from the quantum
reasoning are higher than those from the classical prob-
abilistic reasoning. Notably, degree of the increment is
conspicuous when the amount of the Bob’s preferences
are very weak (as long as |α| 6= 0). Actually, Bob can in-
crease his average scores more than 0.5 when |α| = 0.05
from the quantum reasoning, whereas the increments al-
lowed from the classical probabilistic reasoning are van-
ishingly small. Note that Ξ
(C)
Bob = Ξ
(Q)
Bob = 0 when |α| = 0.
FIG. 8: (Color online) We present the data of Ξ
(C)
Bob (blue
squre) and Ξ
(Q)
Bob (red circle), by assuming that |α| = |α0| =
|α1|. The quantified probabilities in Eq. (3) are assumed to
be good. Each data point is also averaged over 104 trials of
the game. Here we can see that the data are also very well
matched to the theoretical (blue and red dashed) lines, drawn
by Eq. (13) and Eq. (16).
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summarizing, we have presented a classical two-
player (Alice and Bob) game, called the Secret-Bit Guess-
ing Game, where Bob attempts to guess what Alice’s bits
are. Using this game, we designed a legitimate process of
Bob’s reasoning using a simple Boolean function and de-
fined one-player (Bob’s) reasoning problem in the context
of the theory of decision-making. We then considered two
parallel ways of Bob’s reasoning: One is classical proba-
bilistic, and the other is quantum. We primarily inves-
tigated whether or not Bob can get the quantum advan-
tage, particularly without changing the classical setting
of the game. We replaced each reasoning which may oc-
cur in Bob’s brain to a machinery process with the corre-
sponding internal devices. On the basis of the analysis of
payoff function, we explicitly showed that Bob can make
better use of his weak preferences with quantum reason-
ing, faithfully dealing with quantum superposition. This
quantum advantage was possible because the main log-
ical operations present in Bob’s brain provided another
degree of freedom due to the quantum phase, and this en-
abled the rational player, Bob, to explore an additional
way of using his weak preferences to maximize his chance
of winning. The important scientific message of our study
is: It appears to be possible to get a quantum advantage
even in the case where all strategies are classical. We ad-
ditionally investigated (in appendix A) that if the hints
are made to deceive Bob, then Bob’s winning average
can decrease in general. However, in the worst case, such
a disadvantage becomes much more acute. Thus, the
quantum advantage in our game was counter-balanced
with malicious hinting, and allowed us to remark on how
to maximize the potential quantum advantages in such a
system (see also Ref. [22]).
7As a response, one may consider that Bob’s brain can
probabilistically simulate the single-qubit process with
the classical stuffs, and duplicate the measurement out-
comes which accurately compare with those from the
quantum reasoning [46]. However, this does not mean
“there is nothing the quantum” [47]. In fact, to ar-
gue that “a single-qubit cannot be viewed as a genuine
quantum system” as “it can classically be simulable” is a
long-standing problem, and for several years studies have
shown that the single-qubit is incompatible with classical
models in terms of temporal inequalities [23–25], no-go
theorems [26, 27], operational quasi-probability [28], etc.
We believe that our work can provide some intuition
on how can we get a quantum advantage using classical
information or classical data. This question is of partic-
ular significance, since it may be related to some recent
issues, e.g., in the field of quantum machine learning al-
gorithm (see Ref. [29] for more details). Our work is also
expected to open up follow up studies across multiple
disciplines, such as quantum cryptography and artificial
intelligence.
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Appendix A: Further analyses: ‘well-quantified’ and
‘ill-quantified’ probabilities of Bob’s preferences
Here we give further analyses for well-quantified and
ill-quantified probabilities of Bob’s preferences. Firstly,
we recall the total average score Ξ
(C)
Bob of Bob achievable
from the classical probabilistic reasoning. From Eq. (11)
and Eq. (12), we write ξ
(C)
Bob,τ (τ = 1, 2, 3, 4) as below.
ξ
(C)
Bob,1 = α0 + 2α0α1,
ξ
(C)
Bob,2 = α0 − 2α0α1,
ξ
(C)
Bob,3 = −α0 + 2α0α1,
ξ
(C)
Bob,4 = −α0 − 2α0α1. (A1)
It is clear that if there is no bias among the preferences,
i.e., α0 = α1 = 0, then ξ
(C)
Bob,τ = 0 for all τ = 1, 2, 3, 4.
However, if Bob has α = (α0, α1)
T 6= (0, 0)T for the given
hints, Bob can improve his winning average with the
FIG. 9: (Color online) We depict Bob’s score ξ
(C)
Bob,τ averaged
for a specific set of uAlie(x) (x = 0, 1): (top-left) [τ .1] (top-
right) [τ .2], (bottom-left) [τ .3], and (bottom-right) [τ .4]. We
specify the regions of ‘good’ (red dashed box) and ‘bad’ (green
dashed box) probabilities (see, also, Fig. 1).
appropriately assigned directional conditions of α (see
Fig. 1) . More specifically, Bob can have
Ξ
(C)
Bob,best = |α1|+ 2 |α1| |α2| > 0, (A2)
as described in the main text [see Eq. (13)]. However, if
the hinting is malicious, Bob may fail. To see this clearly,
we draw the graphs of ξ
(C)
Bob,τ for the cases τ = 1, 2, 3, 4
(see Fig. 9). In each graph, we specify the regions of
well-quantified (red dashed box) and ill-quantified (green
dashed box) probabilities in the space of (α0, α1). Here
we can imagine any malicious hinting that misleads Bob
toward the green dashed regions. This is the worst sce-
nario for Bob, in which he will have the score
Ξ
(C)
Bob,worst = − |α1| − 2 |α1| |α2| . (A3)
If Bob has to take into account all these situations, it is
evident that Bob will have ΞBob = 0, because he cannot
have any preferences for the given hints.
Then, turning our analysis to the quantum reasoning,
let us write ξ
(Q)
Bob,τ , by using Eq. (11) and Eq. (14), as
ξ
(Q)
Bob,1 = ξ
(C)
Bob,1 + Γcos (pi∆),
ξ
(Q)
Bob,2 = ξ
(C)
Bob,2 − Γ cos (pi∆),
ξ
(Q)
Bob,3 = ξ
(C)
Bob,3 + Γcos (pi∆),
ξ
(Q)
Bob,4 = ξ
(C)
Bob,4 − Γ cos (pi∆), (A4)
where Γ = 2
√(
1
4 − |α1|
2
)(
1
4 − |α2|
2
)
[see Eq. (15)].
Here, it is also true that Bob cannot improve his win-
ning average when α0 = α1 = 0. In such a case, Bob
8FIG. 10: (Color online) We give the graphs of ξ
(Q)
Bob,τ for (top-
left) [τ .1], (top-right) [τ .2], (bottom-left) [τ .3], and (bottom-
right) [τ .4]. We also specify the regions of ‘good’ (red dashed
box) and ‘bad’ (green dashed box) probabilities.
has ξ
(C)
Bob,τ = 0 with cos (pi∆) = 0 for all τ = 1, 2, 3, 4.
However, if he can use well-quantified probabilities in his
quantum reasoning, the average score can be higher than
Eq. (A2). Specifically, Bob can have
Ξ
(Q)
Bob,best = Ξ
(C)
Bob,best + Γ, (A5)
as described in the main text [see Eq. (16)]. However,
there can also be malicious hinting, in which case Bob
may fail, similarly to the classical case. Let us see
the graphs of ξ
(Q)
Bob,τ in Fig. 10, where the regions of
well-quantified (red dashed box) and ill-quantified (green
dashed box) probabilities are also specified. From the
same analysis as in the case of the classical probabilistic
reasoning, we can see that Bob’s total average scores can
be decreased. Notably, in the worst case, such disadvan-
tages can be maximized as
Ξ
(Q)
Bob,worst = Ξ
(C)
Bob,worst − Γ. (A6)
This implies that the quantum reasoning can make the
situation worse. In the case where Bob cannot evaluate
whether the given hints are good or not, it is not possible
for Bob to improve his winnings, as described above.
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